Abstract
Introduction
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is the network that consists of lightweight devices with short-ranged wireless communication and battery-powered. The devices have the sensor that gathers the environmental information and etc. After sensing this information, the devices send the information to the networks. We define such devices as sensor node, and the core parts of the network as sinks and the base station.
Rapid development of WSNs brought themselves to be deployed to various areas such as RF4CE [19] . However, many security studies on WSNs are rather inefficient to be deployed to such environments.
While there are many trials for providing efficient security functions for WSN such as [4, 5, 13, 14] , as one of the fundamental security issues, there are various researches on key management in WSN such as key-pre distribution, pairwise key agreement, group key based key agreement, and hierarchical key management schemes. There were also trials of PKI deployment for WSN [17] . In order to reduce the communication overhead from the key establishment, Huang et al. [10] proposed public key infrastructure (PKI) based model applying Elliptic Curve Cryptography [15] . However, applying PKI requires larger computational power, although it enables the simplified key agreement procedure.
Since it is obvious that the wireless sensor network will be widely deployed by combining network of static sensor network and mobile entities such as [2, 6] , handling a large overhead from frequent node re-authentication requests due to the continuous node movements and the threats of tracing the node movement will be important security issues.
In order to solve such problems, we proposed efficient authentication models that significantly reduce overhead for re-authenticating sensor nodes [7, 8] .
In this paper, we show our model that provide high efficiency in such environments and shows several protocols that we previous introduced in [7, 8] . 
Our Sensor Authentication Model

Dynamic WSN Environment
In this section, we claim the security issues on the node mobility in WSN and problems of previous authentication and key agreement models. In paper Version April 5, 2010 submitted to Sensors Figure 1 . A dynamic mobile node continuously moves in the sensor networks that static lished. The unbroken line denotes the static connection between sinks and the base station line denotes the movement of the mobile node.
[kyusuk1, kyusuk2, kyusuk3], we defined a sensor network model with moving nodes as in Figure 1 . We also defined a static sensor node as Sink, a mobile node as Node, and the base station that is the core network. The node has linear movements in the network. The base station and sinks are static as same as Ibriq and Mahgoub's model [11] . Sinks act as the gateway that link nodes to the base station, and the base station is a kind of headquarter that manages entire networks. When a node initially joins the network, the node connects to a sink in the network and is authenticated by the sink with help of the base station. After that the node moves and reconnects to other sink. In the model, the sink that reauthenticates the node is the neighbor sink of the sink that previously authenticated the node. The reauthentication processes frequently happen due to the node continuously moves in the network.
In practical scenarios, re-authentication happens when a node lost connection to the sink or moved and connected to other sink. For the former case, the node can be easily re-authenticated to the same sink when the connection becomes available again. For the latter case, the node request the re-authentication to other sink that is the near to the previously attached sink.
For such environments several security Issues raise as followings.
Frequent Re-authentication.
Since the sensor have low powered battery and low-end processor with short-range wireless communication, the reducing communication and computational overheads is important to increasing the lifetime of the sensor. However, the mobile sensor node may occur the large overhead for the security computation due to the frequent requests of node reauthentication. When a node connects to a sink, the sink has to authenticate the node. When the node connects to other sink after the movement, the new sink has to authenticate the node again. If the node has continuous movement, the authentication process will also occur repeatedly. It is obvious that the frequent re-authentication processes are the significant factors that drain the resources in batterybased sensor nodes.
However, the current authentication and key distribution protocols are insufficient to be applied in such environment with lack of consideration of the node mobility. Using the current protocols such as [11, 1] , the communication overhead for reauthentication is as same as previous authentication.
Such overhead will be the problem in the environment that the frequent movements of the large number of nodes are happened. Thus, the less computational and communication overheads in reauthentication are very urgent requirement for the node mobility support in the WSN.
Tracing Node Movements.
Considering the mobility of sensor nodes, the tracking of the node movement is one of possible attacks. When the mobile nodes are deployed in battlefields, the tracking by enemies is significant threats for the networks. Thus, the authentication and key agreement protocols should not reveal the node movement. When N that is not authenticated by any sink joins the network, N receives HELLO of S 1 and initiates the initial node authentication with S 1 in Phase 3. Later, N moves and reconnects to S 2 . Then N initiates the node re-authentication in Phase 4. Thus our model consists of following five phases.
Security Requirements
• Phase 0 The common neighbor discovery We define 'Authentication Ticket' that is used for the node reauthentication. When a node requests authentication to a sink, the sink generates the authentication ticket and sends it to the node. The authentication ticket is verified by the authentication key shared to neighbor sinks. Using the authentication ticket, the node movement is untraceable. Verification of the authentication ticket is available to neighbor sinks of the sink that issued the ticket. We adopt the idea of 'cluster key' in [LEAP+] that shared to neighbor sinks. The main difference is that the role of cluster key is very limited to verifying the authentication ticket. Thus, we rename the key as 'authentication key' due to the limited use in the protocol.
Neighbor Sink List.
Assume that static sink nodes are distributed as shown in Figure 4 (a). In this case, the node authenticated by S 3 can be reauthenticated from the neighboring sinks S 1 or S 4 , wherever it moves. However, the sinks may not be well distributed in the real environments. In Figure 4 (b), a node that is authenticated by S 1 cannot directly be re-authenticated by S 5 , since S 5 is not a neighbor sink of S 1 . However, we also see that both S 1 and S 5 have the common neighbor sink S 2 that may link S 1 and S 5 for the re-authentication of N. Thus, we defined the NSL that stores the neighboring sink's information such as their ID, shared secret key, and public key. We assume that each sink has its own NSL. Let the NSL stored in S 1 be 
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We define 'Authentication Ticket' that is used for the node re-authentication. When a node requests authentication to a sink, the sink generates the authentication ticket and sends it to the node. The authentication ticket is able to be verified by the authentication key that is given to neighbor sinks. Using the authentication ticket, the node movement is untraceable. Verification of the authentication ticket is available to neighbor sinks of the sink that issued the ticket. We adopt the idea of 'cluster key' in [16] that shared to neighbor sinks. The main difference is that the cluster key in [16] is used for broadcast communication in the cluster, while the key in our protocol is used for verifying the authentication ticket. Thus, we rename the key as 'authentication key' due to the different use in the protocol. Figure 7 shows that neighbor sinks of Sink 1 (S 1 ) shares the authentication key AK S 1 .
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Static sensor node distribution in (a) Ideal environments (b) Real Environments neighbor sink's information such as ID, shared secret key and public key. We assume that each sink has own NSL. Let the NSL stored in S 1 as NSL S1 = t||sign S1 (h(t)), where t = S 1 ||S 2 ||....||S k and sign S1 is the signature of S 1 as in Table 1 . Figure 8 shows that S 1 and S 5 has common sink, S 2 who can link the two sinks. The signature scheme can be flexibly chosen. When TinyECC is used, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) can be properly used. Whenever a new neighbor sink is found, the sink updates its own NSL.
Pre-Phases of Our Protocol
Our protocol has three pre-phases: Neighbor Discovery, Neighbor Sink List Set Up and Initial Mobile Node Authentication as follows.
Pre-Phase 0: Neighbor Discovery A sink S 1 generates v 0 = sign sk1 (h(HELLO||T S)) , where HELLO is generic HELLO message and T S is time stamp. S 1 broadcasts v 0 with HELLO, T S, pk 1 , and cert S1 as in Figure 6 . Because pk 1 and cert S1 are only required for the Pre-Phase1, any nodes who already know pk 1 and cert S1 will ignore this phase when they receive HELLO. .
After the Phase 2 is completed, sinks share their neighbor sink's authentication keys.
Phase 3: Initial Node Authentication.
When N receives HELLO that S 1 broadcasts in Phase 0 and is not yet authenticated by any sink, N proceeds followings.
1. Node N randomly selects R 1 and generates 
and As a result, S 1 shares a key Pre-Phase 2: Initial Mobile Node Authentication When a mobile sensor node that is only capable of symmetric key computation is firstly joining the network, pre-phase 2 is operated as follows:
PKI-deployed Protocol
1. When a node N receives v 0 from S 1 , N randomly selects R 1 and generates
, where CK N,BS and IK N,BS are shared cipher key and integrity key between N and BS, and sends u 1 and v 1 to S 1 as follows.
2. After receiving u 1 and v 1 , S 1 randomly selects R 2 , and generates
, where CK S1,BS and IK S1,BS are shared cipher key and integrity key between S 1 and BS. Then S 1 sends u 2 , v 1 and v 2 to BS as follows. to S 1 as follows. : || || || S S S S u v → Also, step 4 is modified such that S 1 sends the authenticating information to S 5 via S 2 . We omit the details of the modified step, since the procedure is similar to the step a and b.
How to Reduce Overhead in Initial Authentication
While our protocols in [7, 8] could reduce overhead in re-authentication, they still have the same computation and communication overheads for initial authentication. In order to reduce overhead of sensor nodes during initial authentication, we also proposed authentication protocol for 3G-WSN integrated networks [9] . The main idea is that the application of mobile sensor nodes such as RF4CE [19] will follow integration of multiple networks. Thus the use of the overwhelming capabilities of 3G networks (or 4G eventually) could reduce the use of communication within WSN for establishing secure channel.
Analysis of Protocols
Detailed analyses of protocols are shown in [7, 8] . We do not show the detail in this paper.
Related Work
In this section, we briefly review well-known key agreement protocols designed for the sensor networks. As a commercial solution, Zigbee [3] specifies the key agreement architecture by key predistribution. In their architecture, each node preinstalls its unique keys that are shared with other entities and the network key that is shared with the entire network by the manufacturer. In order to support mobility of a node using a unique key, each node must contain as many keys as the number of nodes. Thus, most studies on authenticated key agreements attempt to increase the efficiency.
Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols for Static Sensor Networks
Most previous key agreement protocols were based on the symmetric key cryptosystem. Eschenauer and Gligor proposed the pairwise key agreement protocols based on the random key predistribution [5] that enabled the sharing of pairwise keys from the pre-distributed key pool. In their protocol, each node stores m number of keys selected from a key pool in the initial stage. After the nodes are deployed, each node shares the key information with its neighboring nodes. When the shared keys are found, the node establishes secure links between the sinks that share the keys. After a link is established, both nodes generate a pairwise key for secure communication. However, the network establishment has a probability of failure that is increased in the case of irregular deployment of sensor nodes or unpredictable interruptions.
Zhu et al. [18] introduced the group-key-based key agreement model that minimized threats of compromised nodes. Every node has a unique key, pairwise keys with neighboring nodes, a cluster key shared with all neighboring nodes, and a global key shared with the entire network. However, they assumed that the networks are static.
Abraham and Ramanatha [1] proposed an authentication and initial shared key establishment model in hierarchical clustered networks. Ibriq and Mahgoub [11] proposed an efficient model that deployed a "partial key escrow table" for sinks. Using the key escrow table, a sink can self-generate a shared key for the attached nodes. However, all sinks have to maintain the information of every node in the table to support node mobility. Figure 2 . In their model, every node shares partial authentication information of other nodes based on the secret sharing scheme [16] . A node sends an authentication request to another node; e.g., the node N 2 is the authenticator and other nodes such as N 5 and N 6 are distributed authentication servers. The overhead on all nodes in this model is large due to their involvement in the authentication process. Since each node has to participate in the authentication procedures as an authenticator or as an authentication server, the computational and communication overhead would significantly increase as a result of frequent authentication requests. Once a node N 1 is authenticated by N 2 , as shown in Figure 7 (a), N 1 sends authentication requests to N 7 , as shown in Figure 7 (b) . In the figure, N 3 , N 4 , N 5 , and N 6 are involved in both authentication processes as authentication servers. Although PKI brings strong and advanced security services, most studies focused on the symmetric key cryptosystem-based approach, due to the insufficient computational resources for PKI of the sensor nodes. However, many efforts that enable PKI for sensor networks such as TinyPK [17] and TinyECC [15] are often proposed. Huang et al. proposed a self-organizing algorithm by using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [10] . Huang's model has two phases: Implicit certificate generation process and Hybrid key establishment process. Once the certificates are issued to nodes, they can self-establish the pairwise keys by exchanging the certificates with other sinks. Simplified representation of the processes is shown in Figure 9 (a). Although Huang et al. did not state that their protocol could be applicable to dynamic WSN, their protocol can support node reauthentication. After the certificate is issued to the node N, N is authenticated by a sink S 1 . When N moves and requests the re-authentication to another sink S 2 , S 2 can easily authenticate N again as shown in Figure 9 (b) . However, their model has two critical problems: (1) all sensor nodes must contact the CA to obtain their certificates. (2) Direct contact is required between each sensor node (including mobile sensor node) and the CA, which is not considered practical for largescale networks. If an implicit certificate is preinstalled to every sink, the advantage of the protocol may be significantly reduced. The other is that every node has to be capable of ECC computation. Even though PKI-based applications for sensor networks will be available in the near future with efficient implementations, the public key-based security architecture still requires more advanced computational power and resources. A sensor node that is only capable of a lightweight cryptosystem such as AES or SHA-1 may not be able to connect to such networks.
Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols For Dynamic WSN
Conclusion
While most current security protocols are designed for the static sensor networks and has several problems that applying such models in dynamic environment may occur significantly large resource drain. In this paper, we introduced our efficient model for authenticated key agreement in dynamic WSN and showed several protocols we proposed in [7, 8] . We showed symmetric key based protocol and hybrid protocol that combines symmetric key base model with PKI based model. Our protocols enable the reduced authentication process for the mobile node and can be used in various application of WSN. However, this model brings the large overhead on each node due to the involvement in the authentication process. Since the node has to participate in the authentication procedures as authenticator or an authentication server, the computational and communication overhead can be significantly increased with frequent authentication requests. Once a node N1 is authenticated by N2 as in Figure 2 (a), N1 requests the reauthentication to N7 as in Figure 2 (b). In the figure, N3, N4, N5, and N6 are involved in both authentication processes as authentication servers.
PKI based Model
Although Public key infrastructure (PKI) brings the strong and advanced security services, most studies focused on the symmetric key crypto-system based approach due to the insufficient computational resources for PKI of the sensor nodes. However, many efforts that enables PKI for sensor networks such as TinyPK [19] and TinyECC [17] are continuously proposed. Huang et al. proposed self-organizing algorithm by using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [12] . Huang's model has two phases; Implicit certificate generation process and Hybrid key establishment process. Once the certificates are issued to nodes, nodes can self establish the pairwise key with exchanging the certificates with any sinks. Brief processes are shown in applicable to the dynamic sensor networks, their protocol can support node reauthentication. After the certificate is issued to the node N , N is authenticated by a sink S 1 . When N moves and requests the reauthentication to other sink S 2 , S 2 can easily authenticates N again as in Figure 3 (b) . However, their model has two critical problems. One is that all sensor nodes must contact CA to obtain their certificates. They require direct contact between each sensor node (including mobile sensor node) and CA, and it does not be considered as practical for large-scale networks. If an implicit certificate is pre-installed to every sink, the advantage of the protocol may be significantly reduced. The other is that every node has to be capable of ECC computation. Even though PKI based applications for the sensor networks will be available in near future with efficient implementation, the public key based security architecture still requires more advanced computational power and resources. A sensor node that is only capable of more lightweight cryptosystem such as AES or SHA-1 may not be able to join to such networks.
